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UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
The courts should be reluctant to formulate crystalizecd, rigid rules of
law for an occurrence subjcct to such infinite variation in its facts as an
automobile collision. Its very nature demands that reason weigh and con-
sider all attendmt circumstances before any conclusion can be rationally
drawn as to their effect upon liability. "No two collisions are exactly alike,
and ... particularly in a rear-end collision, issues of fact are raised, which
should he submitted to the jury . .."' (Emphasis added) This underlies,
in part, the rationale of the prevailing view that permits the inference
of negligence. Moreover, this approach tacitly recognizc6 that in this
situation, negligence can only be established by circumstantial evidence,
collision and injury being tic "facts" from which reasonable men can
infer the ultimate fact, negligice. "Negligence is never presumed; it, or
the circumstantial basis for the inference of it, must be established by
competent proof, and whether it exists is pre-eminently a question . . . for
the jury."3 4 It should remain such.
SAMUEL L. HELLER
CONFLICT OF LAWS--NON-JUDICIAL DIVORCES
Thc petitioner, a non-immigrant alicn student, temporarily in the
United States, was grantcd a non-judicial divorce from his wife living
in Pakistan, by an Islamic religious official in New York. Although this
procecdling was apparently valid in thc domiciliary country of Pakistan,
New York Law required a "duc judicial proceeding" in order to secure
a divorce. Tlhe petitioner brought an action to review an order denying
his application for a change in status to that of a permanent resident
alici, by reason of his marriage to an American citizen. Held, the marriage
was void because of the invalidity of the prior divorce. Shikoh v. Murff,
257 17.2d 306 (2d Cir. 1958).
A widely held view is that non-judicial divorces ' must be authorized
by the law of the state wherein they took place; this rule prevails even
in situations where such divorces have been obtained in compliance with
the law of the nationality or domicile of the parties which generally
governs thcir personal status.- rI1he reason for this view is based on primary
33. O'Donnell v. United Electric lRys. Co., 48 R.I. 18, 134 Atd. 642(1926),
34. Murphy v. Terzako, 14 N.J. Super. 2S4, 82 A.2d 1(1951).
I. '1l'e casenote will concern itself with a comparative study of the English and
American positions on recognition of noujudicial divorces occurring within their
territorial jurisdiction, but valid acording to the law of the foreign domicile of the
iudividual parties.
2. 1 RAIIEL, 'H: CONFL.TC'r OF LAws: A COMPARATIVE S'riUrs 485 (1947);
3 ARMINJOt, PRECS DE DROIT iN'ERNATIONAL PRIVI" 34, 35 (1931); WOLFF, INTErR-
NAT1ONAi.ES PRIVATREIIT 132 (1933); NUSSBAUM, DEiTSCI ES INTERNATIONALES
IRIVATRECEIT IJNTI.R RESONDEN ]BER(JCKSICTIlc, NG DES OSTIERREICJISCFIEN UND SCllWEIZE-
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principles of international law. It is well established that a nation exercises
within its own territory an absolute and exclusive jurisdiction over the
acts of residents and aliens alike." Conversely, a foremost restriction
imposed by international law upon any other state is, that in the absence
of a permissive rule to the contrary, it may not evercise its powers in
any form in the territory of the former nation.
4
The lex loci actus, therefore, determines the effect of a divorce by
controlling the form in which divorce is granted, if at all, including
the determination of authorities granting the divorce. If foreigners may
be divorced at all, they are limited to the form prescribed for subjects
of the forum by the local law. A divorce granted through other procedures
or by other officials would, by local standards, have no legal significance.5
Upon this proposition, religious and private divorces have been declared
void when performed within the United States."
This jurisdictional approach results in the following conflict of laws
problem: if a divorce has been pronounced by someone who has no authority
to do so according to the lex loci actus, the act is a nullity in the country
where pronounced ceven though it might be valid under the personal, i.e.,
national or domiciliary, law of the parties. '['he result is what has been
described as a "limping" divorce.7
To avoid this situation, the opposite view advances the proposition
that non-contentious divorces should he recognized by every jurisdiction,
even when they are not made in compliance with the law of the state
in whose territory they are rendered, provided only that they are recognized
RISCIIEN REcur-s 164 n. 5 (1932); cf. 3 FREM.AAN, LAw OF JUOIrtE'rs 3095 (5th ed.1925).
in the United States, cases recognizing such divorces when it was found that the
parties were domiciled in the foreign country where granted, seem to imply this attitude;
see, e.g., Miller v. Miller, 70 Misc. 368, 128 N.Y. Supp. 787, 790 (Sup. Ct. 1911),
"A rabbinical divorce granted here would have no validity." However, it seems that
the Shikoh case is the first one to stand for the proposition factually.
3. Case of the S.S. "Lotus" P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10 (1927); RESTATEMIENT,
FOREIGN RiLATIONs LAW § 9 (Tent. Draft No. 1, (1957).
4. Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, I1 U.S. (7 Cranch) 11, 136 (1812);
Case of the S.S. "Lotus" P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10 (1927).
5. 1 RABEL supra note 2, at 417.
6. In re Goldman's Estate, 156 Misc. 817, 282 N.Y. Supp. 787, 790 (Surr. Ct,
1935); "Since the effect of any act must be detennined by. thc law of the place where
such act is performed, . . . and the transactions purporting to grant the divorce were
performed in the state of New York whose fundamental law provides that no divorce
shall be granted other than due iudicial proceedings, it follows that the purported
divorce was a nullity and wholly ineffectual to dissolve the marriage between the
parties."
Accord, In re Spiegel. 21 F. 2d 605 (S,..N.Y, 1928); Chertok v. Chertok, 208
App. Div. 161, 203 N.Y. Supp. 163 (Sup. Ct. 1924), (divorce decree by a Rabbi in
New York, granted to a husband in New York, against his wife living in Russia, held
invalid despite compliance with the law of the Soviet government); In re Cheney's
Estate, 162 Misc. 764, 295 N.Y. Stpp. 567 (Surr. Ct. 1937).
7. VOLFr, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 369 (2d ed. 1950).
1958]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
by the state of which the parties are nationals or domiciliariesYs The
justification is sought in the principle that alterations of status are governed
by the personal law of the parties."
Regarding domicile as of paramount importance in determining
questions of status,' English courts have recently adopted this principle
in a fact pattern strikingly similar to the instant case. In Har-Shedi v.
Har-Shefi,'' an Englishwoman had married an Israeli domiciled in
Israel."' Shortly afterwards they visited England where the husband gave
his wife a bill of divorcement in the presence of, and sanctioned by, a
Rabbi in London.', Subsequent to the husband's deportation, the wife
asked for a declaratory judgment of the English court as to the validity
of the divorce. Deciding on the merits of the case,' 4 the court found that
upon the evidence the divorce was valid according to the law of Israel.
It did not consider that the absence of a judicial proceeding affected
8. In England, DIcEY, CONFLZctr Or LAws 314 (7th ed. 1958), and CHESHIRE,
PRIvATE INTERNATIONAL LAw 380 (5th ed. 1957) both adopt this view. In accord,
Ryan, Conflict of Laws-Recognition of "Foreign Divorce"-urisdietion to Make a
Declaration of Status, 32 CAN. B. REv. 1027 (1954).
See, I RABEL supra note 2 at 485; 3 I"RANKENSTEIN, INTERNATIONALES PRIVA-
TRECHT 560 n. 70 (1926-1935) and decisions cited by hin.
French courts have allowed foreign Jewish couples to divorce on French soil in
Jewish form, i.e., by bill of divorcencnt, PILLET & NIBOYET, MANUEL DE DRor
INTERNATIONAL PRIVE 870 (2d ed. 1928); 3 ARMIN)ON, PRECIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL
PRIVE 35 II. 3 (1931).
9. See generally I Rabel supra note 2 at 101-160.
10. Niboyet v. Niboyet [1878] L.R. 4 P.D. 1, 12 per Brett, L.J. dissenting:
"The law which enables a court to decree an alteration in the relation between husband
and wife .. .is a matter of principle the law of the country to which by ...domicile
they owe obedience. The only court which can divorce by virtue of such law is the
court of that country." This reasoning followed that in Wilson v. Wilson, [1872]
L,R. 2 P. & D. 435; and the rule that divorce jurisdiction belongs exclusively to the
law of the domicile and the law applied, that of the domicile, was subsequently
established in Le Mousier v. Le Mousier, [1895] 20 A.C. 517 (P.C.). The exception,
see DicEY supra note 8 at 314, in Armitage v. Attorney General, [1906] P. 135,
allows recognition in England of a foreign divorce where it was granted outside the
domiciliary state provided the divorce is recognized as valid according to the law of
the domicile. But note that the rule is consistent with the opinion that domicile is of
paramount importance in detemining questions of status.
11. [19531 P. 220; following the reasoning in Sasson v. Sasson, 11924] A.C.
1007 (P.C.); followed in iIandel v. Mandel, [1925] Vict. L.R. 51.
2. In England, the doctrine that the domicile of the husband is, by law, time
wife's as well, Harvey v. Farnie [1882] 8 A.C. 43; Attorney General for Alberta v.
Cook [1926] A.C. 444 (P.C.); see Dscur stpra note 8 at 119; is subject only to the
qualifications made by the Matrimonial Causes Acts, 1937, 1 Edw. 8 & 1 Geo. 6,
e. 57; 1944, 7 & 8 Geo. 6, C. 43; 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6, c. 100; Griswold, Divorce
Jurisdiction and Recognition of Divorce Decrees--A Comparative Study, 65 HARV. L.
REv. 193, 197 (1951).
In the United States, a wife may establish a separate domicile of her own for
purposes of divorce, Cheever v. Wilson, 76 U.S. (9 Wall) 108 (1869); Ditson v.
Ditson, 4 R.I. 87 (1856).
13. [lhe only divorce known to the law of Israel was that given by religious
tribunals; for Jews the Rabbinical court, and for Moslems the Shari court. Bentwich,
Recognition of Religious Divorce, 102 L.J. 662 (1952).
14. Har-Shefi v. lar-Siefi 11953] P. 163, was concerned with the procedural
question of whether the wife had standing to bring a suit for a declaratory judgment.
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the recognition of the divorce', and held that the marriage, having been
dissolved by the only form of divorce open to a Jew domiciled in Israel,
should be recognized as having been dissolved for the purposes of English
law.
It is to be noted that no judicial process had been put in motion
in the Israeli domicile, and that what was held to constitute a valid
divorce was an act performed wholly in England. The determinative
question was not whether it had been obtained within the country of
domicile, but whether it had been obtained in compliance with the law
of the domicile without regard to the fact that this law was put into
operation outside of such domicile.'
The Har-She f decision presents an interesting contrast with the instant
case. One significant fact in Shikoh was that the purported divorce was
apparently valid according to the law of the domicile, it being the only
form of divorce available to a Moslem domiciled in Pakistan. 7 But of
equal significance here was the fact that the parties interested were both
non-domiciliaries of this country, a fact which was not present in cases
before our courts invalidating previous non-judicial divorces granted within
this country.' Clearly, the status of a person domiciled here could not
be affected by such a divorce. But what of non-domiciliaries whose
personal law, in matters of status, makes non-judicial divorces available?'9
15. Had one, or both of the parties been domiciled in England, the delivery of the
bill of divorcement would have had no effect upon the status of the parties since
England insists on judicial proceedings to effectuate a valid divorce. Preger v. Preger,
[1926] 42 T.L.R. 281; Joseph v. Joseph [1953] 2 All E.R. 710 (C.A.).
16. The decision in the Har-Shefi case was enthusiastically received by English
textwriters. DICEY, CONFLICT OF LAws 307,8 (7th ed. 1958) "Such recognition is
consistent with the status theory of divorce and with the paramount importance of
domicile in question of status."; CnEsiRE, supra note 8 at 380," . . . since it satisfies
the general principle that alterations of status are governed by the lex domicilii", and
note the forceful reasoning that follows; Ryan, Conflict of Laws-Recognition of
"Foreign Divorce"--Jurisdiction to Make Declaration of Status, 32 CAN. B. REv. 1027,
1043 (1954), "The writer would express the hope that the Har-Shefi decision marks
the beginning of a rational approach by our (English) courts to problems of this kind,
based not on an assumption of the superiority of our institutions, but on a desire to
recognize facts arising from the rules of foreign laws over which our courts should
not wish to exercise any control."
17. GLEDIIJLL, PAKISTAN, TILE DEvELOPMENT OF ITS LAWS AND CONSTITUTION
192 (1957); Gina & KRAMERS, SHORTER ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ISLAM 564 (1953).
18. Religious divorces occurring within this country have been invalidated, hut in
every instance at least one of the parties was domiciled here. See, h, re Spiegel, 24
F. 2d 605 (S.D.N.Y. 1928); Chertok v. Chertok, 208 App. Div. 161, 203 N.Y. Supp.
163 (Sup. Ct. 1924); In re Cheney's Estate, 162 Misc. 764, 295 N.Y. Supp. 567
Surr .Ct. 1937); In re Goldman's Estate, 156 Misc. 817, 282 N.Y. Supp. 787 (Surr.
t.1935)
19. It is accepted in the United States, as well as in England, that matters of status
are determined by the law of the domicile. See, e.g., Strader v. Graham, 51 U.S.
(10 How.) 82 (1850); Pfeifer v. Wright, 34 F. 2d 690 (N.D. Okla. 1927); Woodward
v. Woodward, 87 Tenn. 644, 11 S.W. 892 (1889). Also, RESTATEMENT (FIRasT),
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 54 (1934); 1 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS 468 (1935): "the state
of domicil of the parties to a status is the state which is generally agreed in our law to
have jurisdiction over status." And again, "Jurisdiction of the state of domicil . . . is
. . . based upon legal reason. It is because the state of domicil is most concerned with
the family life of those whose home is in its territory."; GooDnciCr, CONFLICT OF
LAWS 396 (3d ed. 1949).
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The court noted that had the divorce been obtained within the
country of doinicile, it would most likely receive recognition here.20 But
recognition would not be extended '-" whcre the act purporting to be a
divorce took place within the territorial jurisdiction of New York between
persons even if not domiciled therein. The court referred to the lex loci
actus to declare that the divorce must be secured in accordance with
the laws of that state.
2
20. Courts in the United States generally recognize foreign religious divorces
when they are recognized as valid when granted within the domiciliary state. See, e.g.,
Sobel v. People, 212 I11. 238, 72 N.E. 382 (1904); Roth v. Roth, 104 Ill. 35, 44
Am. Rep. 81 (1882); Kapigian v. Minassian, 212 Mass. 412, 99 N.E. 264 (1912);
Matter of Spondre, 98 Misc. 524, 162 N.Y. Supp. 943 (Sup. Ct. 1917); Miller v.
Miller, 70 Misc. 368, 128 N.Y. Supp. 787 (Sup. Ct. 1911); Saperstone v. Saperstone,
73 Misc. 631, 131 N.Y. Supp. 241 (Sup. Ct. 1911); Leshinsky v. Leshiusky, 5 Misc.
495, 25 N.Y. Supp. 841 (Super. Ct. 1893); Matter of Rubinstein's Estate, 143 Misc.
917, 257 N.Y. Supp. 637 (Sur. Ct. 1932); Machransky v. Machransky, 31 Ohio App.
482, 166 N.E. 423 (1927). See 27 C.J.S. Divorce § 327 (1958).
Other non-contentious divorces recognized here when performed within foreign
jurisdictions are found in the following cases: Starr v. Pease, 8 Conn. 541 (1831);
Levins v. Sleator, 2 Greene, Iowa 604 (1850); Adams v. Palmer, 51 Me. 480 (1863);
Clark v. Clark, 10 N.H. 380 (1839), (legislative decrees); Sorenson v. Sorenson, 219
App. Div. 344, 220 N.Y. Supp. 242 (Sup. Ct. 1927) (executive decree); Marls v.
Sockey, 170 F. 2d 597 (10th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 914 (1949); La
Framboise v. Day, 136 Minn. 239, 161 N.A. 529 (1917); James v. Adamus, 56 Okla.
450, 155 P. 1121 (1915) (Indian divorces when performed on the reservations).
Our courts have also recognized judicial divorces granted in a foreign jurisdiction
at a time when the parties thereto were residing in the United States. In each case,
however, it was found that the parties were still properly subject to the jurisdiction
of the foreign court. Oettgen v. Oettgen, 196 Misc. 937, 94 N.Y.S. 2d 168 (Sup. Ct.
1949); Hansen v. Hansen, 255 App. Div. 1016, 8 N.Y.S. 2d 655 (Sup. Ct. 1938);
Weill v. Weill, 26 N.Y.S. 2d 467 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1941).
21. It is interesting to note thit the principle laid down in Armitage v. Attorney
General [19061 P. 135, to which England [Clark v. Clark 1921 37 T.L.R. 815; Pcrin
v. Pein (19501 Scots L.T.R. 51; Walker v. Walker 1950 4 D.L.R. 2531 and the
United States IDean v. Dean, 241 N.Y. 240, 149 N.E. 844 (1925); Ball v. Cross,
231 N.Y. 329, 132 N.E. 106 (1921)1 have ascribed, has eventually led to a split. The
Arnitage case established an exception to the rule of Le Mousier v. Le Mousier, 118951
A.C. 517, that a divorce could be granted only in the state of domicile. Under the
Annitage doctrine, a divorce obtained outside of the domicile, but valid according to
its law, will be recognized as valid in the forn considering the question. The facts
of the Armitage case involved a South Dakota divorce, where the husband, by English
standards, was domiciled in New York. Since the divorce was recognized as valid in
New York, then England, the forum considering the question, would also recognize it's
validity. The lHar.Shefi case appears to have extended and supported the doctrine to
include recognition of divorces granted, not in a third jurisdiction, but in England itself,
by a process which has no legal significance there. See )IcEY, CONFLICTS OF LAw
314 (7th ed. 198); Thomas, Declaration as to Effect of a Foreign Decree of Divorce,
2 INT'L & CoMp. L.Q. 444 (1953). Faced with the same factual opportunity, the
court in the Shikoh case declined to follow the example set in the Iar-Shefi case.
Although not applied in the Shikoh case, the Armnitage principle is not without support
in the United States. It has been described as being4. . . in accordance with sound
doctrine,", BFALE, CONFLICTs Or LAws 470 (1935). Also, Griswold, Divorce Jurisdiction
and Recognition of Divorce Decrees--A Comparative Study, 65 ItArv. L. REv. 193,
223 (1951), "This appears to be an entirely sound decision. The underlying basis of
the rule of domicil in divorce jurisdiction is the desire for certainty. The state of domicil
is regarded as the state having the closest connection with the parties, and the greatest
interest in their status. If that state regards them as divorced, the fact should be
recognized elsewhere."
22. N.Y. COrST. art. I, § 9 (1894), providcs in part: T. nor shall any divorce
be granted other than by due judicial proceedings; . . "
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Tested against established international principles, 23 the decision in
the Shikoh case seems reasonable. Although domicile determines the con-
trolling law as to the personal status of the individuals,24 it still does not
confer any extra-territorial governmental powers on an agent of a govern-
ment, or a quasi-governmental agent of a religious organization in the
country of domicile..25 This applies even more so to a unilateral act of
repudiation by a private party attempting to effectuate a divorce in this
country according to the law of his domieile.26 What law applies to the
substantive question in the case is a choice of law problem; but who has
power to administer the controlling law remains first and foremost a
question of jurisdiction.
It is this latter question which the English court turned aside in the
Har-Shefi case, giving effect to the personal law of the individuals as
contained in their law of domicile; a decision which Cheshire describes as
exemplifying a "shift of emphasis from jurisdiction to choice of law."'2 7
The fact remains that in both the Slzikoh and Har-Shefi cases, a
religious divorce was effectuated in jurisdictions which insist on judicial
proceedings. In effect, the power vested under local law in local judicial
authorities was being usurped by a quasi-governmental agent of a foreign
religious society with jurisdictional powers limited to such foreign country.
This represents a clear contravention of the international principle that
prohibits one country from exercising extra-territorial powers in another
without the latter's consent. Furthermore, the function was exercised in
a form unknown to local law.
Finally, a most interesting factor present in the instant case seems to
distinguish it from the Har-Shefi case. The latter case concerned an
inter-party private relationship, where the effect of the divorce sought
only to bind the two individuals. In the Shikoh case the divorce sought
to have a binding effect not only upon the private relationship, but also
upon an arm of the national government represented by the Immigration
and Naturalization Service for the District of New York.
It is difficult indeed to iniaginc on what consitutional basis a private
23. Schooner Exchange v. Mc Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812);
Case of the S.S. "Lotus" P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10 (1927).
24. See notes 10 and 19 supra.
25. ". . . a state . . . may not exercise its power in any form in the territory
of another state." Case of the S.S. "Lotus" P.C.I.J,, ser. A, No. 10 (1927).
26. In a similar situation, an Iranian national in Turkey attempted to divorce his
wife by unilateral repudiation in accordance with the law of his nationality, to wit,
Moslem religious law. Even Turkish courts [Cour de Cassation, October 28, 19501
would not allow it, one of the grounds being that repudiation is contrary to Turkish
public policy. "It will be seen that this institution (Moslem unilateral repudiation,
talaq) which forms part of Moslem Law, is very different from civil divorce under
Turkish Law, which can only be granted after judicial inquiry upon certain specific
grounds laid down by law." 84 Journal du droit international 1041 (1956).
27. CHEisHIar., supra note 8 at 384.
19581
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW V
act, authenticated by an official of a foreign religious society even if
locally incorporated, would be binding upon a governmental agency.
EDWARD KAUFMAN
DUE PROCESS* - JURISDICTION OVER
NON-RESIDENT TRUSTEES
A testatrix-settlor executed an inter vivos trust narning a Delaware
corporate trustee. Power to alter, amend, revoke, change the trustee and
receive income for life was reserved. It was further provided that the settlor
had a power of appointment as to the relmaining corpus, either inter vivos
or testamentary. After becoming domiciled in Florida, she made her last
appointment in favor of two previously created trusts in Delaware, with the
remainder in favor of the executrix, the appellant. The will directed the
portion appointed to the appellant be paid in equal installments to the
testatrix's two daughters, the appellces. The latter sued for declaratory
relief urging the invalidity of the last created trusts as an invalid disposition
under the Florida statute of wills.' Personal service was effected upon a
majority of interested persons except the Delaware trustee; however, a copy
of the pleadings together with a notice to appear were sent to the trustee
and notice was published locally in compliance with the Florida constructive
service statute.2 The Florida court held the trust invalid and that jurisdiction
to construe the will entailed substantive jurisdiction over absent defendants
even though the trust assets were not within the state. The appellant-
executrix brought suit in Delaware and that state's supreme court held
that there had been a lack of jurisdiction and refused full faith and credit
to the Florida decree.4 On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court,
held, Florida decree reversed (that state having had insufficient contacts
to give it jurisdiction); Dclaware decree affirmed. Hanson v. Denkla, 357
U.S. 235 (1958).
The law in regard to a forum state's jurisdiction over non-residents
has passed through three major stages in its evolutionary process.5 Stage
One need only be traced back to the landmark case of Pennoyer v. Neff
*For a detailed discussion see Comment, this issue 1p. 205, supra.
1, FLA. STAT. § 731.07 (1957).
2. FLA. STAT. § 48.01 (1957).
3. Hanson v. Denckla, 100 So. 2d 378 (Fla. 1956).
4. Hanson v. Wilmington Trust Co., 119 A.2d 901 (Del. 1957).
5. Presence, minimum contacts, minimum contact, [seemingly from the case of
McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957)1. Consent is embraced
in the presence theory, see Travelers Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950).
[ OL. XtI
